htcondor 8.6.8~dfsg.1-2 / usr / sbin / condor_aklog

#!/bin/bash

##**************************************************************
##
## Copyright (C) 1990-2016, Condor Team, Computer Sciences Department,
## University of Wisconsin-Madison, WI.
##
## Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you
## may not use this file except in compliance with the License.  You may
## obtain a copy of the License at
##
##    http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
##
## Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
## distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
## WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
## See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
## limitations under the License.
##
##**************************************************************

## Author: Todd Tannenbaum <tannenba@cs.wisc.edu>, December 1, 2016.

# condor_aklog is a wrapper script for aklog on Linux.
#
# How to use:
# 1. Set environment variable KRB5CCNAME to point to the FILE-based
#    Kerberos 5 credential cache that will be used to create the
#    AFS token (same as with aklog).
# 2. Optionally, set environment variable CONDOR_KRB5_UID to the uid
#    which should have access to the AFS token to be created by aklog.
#    If unset, condor_aklog attempt to lookup the Kerberos credential cache
#    default principal in the passwd database (as defined by nsswitch.conf).
# 3. Run condor_aklog with the same real-uid that was used to launch the
#    condor_master daemon (typically root), using the same command-line
#    arguments (if any) as were desired with aklog.
#
# Options:
# Same as aklog.
#
# Exit status:
# 50 if there is an error setting up the keyrings, else whatever exit
# status is returned by aklog (zero on success, non-zero on failure).
#
# Description:
# condor_aklog is a Linux-specifc wrapper script for aklog that will
# store the AFS token into a kernel session keyring named "htcondor_uidX",
# where X is the UID of the user being impersonated, by
# 1. securely creating or joining session htcondor_uidX, 
# 2. creating a PAG # in the session via pagsh if and only if a PAG does 
#    not already exist, then
# 3. run aklog, and finally
# 4. link this session keyring to the user-specific keyring for the
#    user that invoked condor_aklog so it is not garbage-collected.
#
# More information:
# https://htcondor-wiki.cs.wisc.edu/index.cgi/tktview?tn=6032

##**************************************************************

# Helper function: Exit with status $1 and send $2 to stderr.
exitwitherr() { 
  printf "%s. Aborting.\n" "$2" >&2
  exit "$1"
}

# Helper function: Check that each parameter can be found in the PATH.
checkexist() {
  for prog in "$@"; do
    hash $prog 2>/dev/null || exitwitherr 50 "Failed to find $prog installed in path"
  done
}

# Our script is divded into two parts; Part 1 is invokved by the
# user running "condor_aklog".  At the end of Part 1, condor_aklog
# invokes itself a second time with "condor_aklog -htcpart2 ..." which
# results in Part 2 of the script being executed as a child process.
# This is neccesary because the "keyctl session" command
# starts a new subshell process.
# Part 2 does more setup and then invokes aklog, writing the exit
# status of aklog into stdout where it is read by Part 1 and returned
# to the user.

#
# PART 1
# This is the entry-point of the script.
#

if [ "$1" != "-htcpart2" ]; then

  # Make sure some required utilities are installed in our PATH.

  checkexist klist keyctl aklog awk cut

  # Validate we have a Kerberos credential cache.

  klist -s || exitwitherr 50 "Failed to find a valid KRB5 credential cache"

  # Set up reasonable defaults for CONDOR_RINGID and CONDOR_KRB5_UID.
  # If CONDOR_KRB5_UID is unset, try to figure out the uid associated with the
  # AFS token we are about to stash by looking for the Kerberos cache
  # default principal in the passwd database.

  export master_ring=${CONDOR_RINGID:-"@u"}
  if [ -n "$CONDOR_KRB5_UID" ]; then
    id="$CONDOR_KRB5_UID"
  else
    checkexist grep xargs getent
    id="${CONDOR_KRB5_UID:-`klist | grep "Default principal" | cut -d' ' -f3 | cut -d@ -f1 | cut -d/ -f1 | xargs getent passwd`}" \
      || exitwitherr 50 "Failed to find uid for default principal"
    id=`echo "$id" | cut -d: -f3`
  fi 

  # Invoke "keyctl session htcondor_uidX", and run Part 2 of this
  # script (see below) in that new session. Echo any output back
  # to the terminal except for the "Joined session key..." crud that
  # keyctl pollutes into stdout (we want our output to mimic aklog). Also
  # Part2 of our script below will echo the exit status of the real aklog
  # to our stream; read that exit status and exit with the same value
  # so condor_aklog returns whatever aklog returned.  We need to do this
  # because "keyctrl session" fails to propagate exit codes.

  export uid_ring_name="htcondor_uid$id"
  keyctl session "$uid_ring_name" "$0" "-htcpart2" "$@" |& awk \
  '/^Joined session key/ { next }
   /^aklog_real_exit_code/ { exit $2 }
   { print $0 }
  ' -

  # Exit with whatever awk exits with in the command above, which
  # is the same as whatever aklog exited with in Part 2 below.

  exit $?

#
# End of PART 1
#

else 

#
# PART 2
# This part of the script runs in after Part 1 has completed
# and the htcondor_uidX keyring has been setup as the active
# session keyring.
#

  # Throw away argument "-htcpart2" so we don't pass it to aklog.

  shift

  # Make sure we have some required utilities, aware that the PATH
  # may have changed since PART 1 ran (although this is not likely).

  checkexist keyctl aklog cut flock

  # Make certain our real-uid matches the uid of the htcondor_uidX
  # session keyring we joined at the end of PART 1.  We do this as
  # a security safeguard because, unfortunately, "keyctl session <name>"
  # will simply join the first visible keyring found with that description,
  # and there is no way to join a keyring by id.  Sigh, the Linux kernel
  # really should have a call to join a keyring by id, but it does not.
  # The concern is a malicious non-privledged user could create a keyring
  # named "htcondor_uidX" and set the Search permission control mask
  # such that condor_aklog running "keyctl session htcondor_uidX" as root
  # joins it (and then connects an AFS PAG to this keyring).  To prevent
  # this, validate the uid owner of the session keyring is the same as
  # our real-uid and bail-out now if funny business is detected.

  session_uid=`keyctl rdescribe @s | cut -d\; -f2`
  if [ "$session_uid" != $UID ]; then
    exitwitherr 50 "Uid of keyring $uid_ring_name is $session_uid, but ruid is $UID"
  fi

  # Link our session keyring to the user-specific keyring that invoked
  # condor_aklog (typically, the user keyring for uid 0) so that
  # this session keyring is not immediately garbage-collected by the kernel
  # when condor_aklog exits.

  keyctl link @s "$master_ring" \
    || exitwitherr 50 "Failed to link keyring $uid_ring_name to master ring $master_ring"

  # Create a PAG in the session via pagsh if and only if a PAG does not
  # already exist, and upon creating a it, link it to our
  # current session keyring. If a PAG is not already found, we need
  # to use a lock file to ensure there is only one PAG attached to this
  # session keyring even in the event of multiple instances of condor_aklog
  # running simultaneously.  If we need to lock, we use a read-only file
  # descriptor to the KRB5 credential cache file since only trusted
  # processes (root or the user that owns the cache) should be able to
  # read that file.  This way we avoid creating lock files in /tmp with
  # well-known names and expose root to symlink attacks (some Linux
  # distros still have world-write permission on /var/lock... I am looking
  # at you, Debian 7!).

  export uid_ring_id=`keyctl search @s keyring "$uid_ring_name"`
  lockfile="/${KRB5CCNAME#*/}"
  if [ "$KRB5CCNAME" != "$lockfile" -a "${KRB5CCNAME%%:*}" != "FILE" ]; then
    exitwitherr 50 "Only KRB5 caches of type FILE are supported"
  fi
  keyctl search @s afs_pag _pag >&/dev/null || \
    { 
	  # Wait for an exclusive lock, 20 second timeout
	  flock -x -w 20 200 \
	    || exitwitherr 50 "Failed to obtain file lock on $lockfile"
	  # Make certain session keyring has uid write access so we can link
	  # the PAG session below.
	  keyctl setperm @s 0x1f3f0000 \
		  || exitwitherr 50 "Failed to setperm on session keyring"
	  # We must test again for the pag once we have the lock, in
	  # order to guarantee an atomic test-and-set operation. If a search
	  # for an afs_pag fails, create it via pagsh and link to our session.
	  keyctl search @s afs_pag _pag >&/dev/null || \
	    pagsh -c "keyctl link @s $uid_ring_id" || \
		  exitwitherr 50 "Failed to link PAG to htcondor_uid session"
    } 200<$lockfile || exitwitherr 50 "KRB5CCNAME file does not exist"

  # Finally, run aklog with whatever command-line args the user gave us.
  # Write the exit code returned by aklog onto stdout, which is read
  # by our parent process (at the tail end of PART 1 above).

  aklog "$@"
  echo aklog_real_exit_code $?

#
# End PART2
#

fi

# End of condor_aklog