/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/pgpy/packet/fields.py is in python3-pgpy 0.4.3-3.
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"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, division
import abc
import binascii
import collections
import copy
import hashlib
import itertools
import math
import os
from pyasn1.codec.der import decoder
from pyasn1.codec.der import encoder
from pyasn1.type.univ import Integer
from pyasn1.type.univ import Sequence
from pyasn1.type.namedtype import NamedTypes, NamedType
from cryptography.exceptions import InvalidSignature
from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import dsa
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import padding
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.concatkdf import ConcatKDFHash
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.keywrap import aes_key_wrap
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.keywrap import aes_key_unwrap
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.padding import PKCS7
from .subpackets import Signature as SignatureSP
from .subpackets import UserAttribute
from .subpackets import signature
from .subpackets import userattribute
from .types import MPI
from .types import MPIs
from ..constants import EllipticCurveOID
from ..constants import HashAlgorithm
from ..constants import PubKeyAlgorithm
from ..constants import String2KeyType
from ..constants import SymmetricKeyAlgorithm
from ..decorators import sdproperty
from ..errors import PGPDecryptionError
from ..errors import PGPError
from ..symenc import _decrypt
from ..symenc import _encrypt
from ..types import Field
__all__ = ['SubPackets',
'UserAttributeSubPackets',
'Signature',
'RSASignature',
'DSASignature',
'ECDSASignature',
'PubKey',
'OpaquePubKey',
'RSAPub',
'DSAPub',
'ElGPub',
'ECDSAPub',
'ECDHPub',
'String2Key',
'ECKDF',
'PrivKey',
'OpaquePrivKey',
'RSAPriv',
'DSAPriv',
'ElGPriv',
'ECDSAPriv',
'ECDHPriv',
'CipherText',
'RSACipherText',
'ElGCipherText',
'ECDHCipherText', ]
class SubPackets(collections.MutableMapping, Field):
_spmodule = signature
def __init__(self):
super(SubPackets, self).__init__()
self._hashed_sp = collections.OrderedDict()
self._unhashed_sp = collections.OrderedDict()
def __bytearray__(self):
_bytes = bytearray()
_bytes += self.__hashbytearray__()
_bytes += self.__unhashbytearray__()
return _bytes
def __hashbytearray__(self):
_bytes = bytearray()
_bytes += self.int_to_bytes(sum(len(sp) for sp in self._hashed_sp.values()), 2)
for hsp in self._hashed_sp.values():
_bytes += hsp.__bytearray__()
return _bytes
def __unhashbytearray__(self):
_bytes = bytearray()
_bytes += self.int_to_bytes(sum(len(sp) for sp in self._unhashed_sp.values()), 2)
for uhsp in self._unhashed_sp.values():
_bytes += uhsp.__bytearray__()
return _bytes
def __len__(self): # pragma: no cover
return sum(sp.header.length for sp in itertools.chain(self._hashed_sp.values(), self._unhashed_sp.values())) + 4
def __iter__(self):
for sp in itertools.chain(self._hashed_sp.values(), self._unhashed_sp.values()):
yield sp
def __setitem__(self, key, val):
# the key provided should always be the classname for the subpacket
# but, there can be multiple subpackets of the same type
# so, it should be stored in the format: [h_]<key>_<seqid>
# where:
# - <key> is the classname of val
# - <seqid> is a sequence id, starting at 0, for a given classname
i = 0
if isinstance(key, tuple): # pragma: no cover
key, i = key
d = self._unhashed_sp
if key.startswith('h_'):
d, key = self._hashed_sp, key[2:]
while (key, i) in d:
i += 1
d[(key, i)] = val
def __getitem__(self, key):
if isinstance(key, tuple): # pragma: no cover
return self._hashed_sp.get(key, self._unhashed_sp.get(key))
if key.startswith('h_'):
return [v for k, v in self._hashed_sp.items() if key[2:] == k[0]]
else:
return [v for k, v in itertools.chain(self._hashed_sp.items(), self._unhashed_sp.items()) if key == k[0]]
def __delitem__(self, key):
##TODO: this
raise NotImplementedError
def __contains__(self, key):
return key in set(k for k, _ in itertools.chain(self._hashed_sp, self._unhashed_sp))
def __copy__(self):
sp = SubPackets()
sp._hashed_sp = self._hashed_sp.copy()
sp._unhashed_sp = self._unhashed_sp.copy()
return sp
def addnew(self, spname, hashed=False, **kwargs):
nsp = getattr(self._spmodule, spname)()
for p, v in kwargs.items():
if hasattr(nsp, p):
setattr(nsp, p, v)
nsp.update_hlen()
if hashed:
self['h_' + spname] = nsp
else:
self[spname] = nsp
def update_hlen(self):
for sp in self:
sp.update_hlen()
def parse(self, packet):
hl = self.bytes_to_int(packet[:2])
del packet[:2]
# we do it this way because we can't ensure that subpacket headers are sized appropriately
# for their contents, but we can at least output that correctly
# so instead of tracking how many bytes we can now output, we track how many bytes have we parsed so far
plen = len(packet)
while plen - len(packet) < hl:
sp = SignatureSP(packet)
self['h_' + sp.__class__.__name__] = sp
uhl = self.bytes_to_int(packet[:2])
del packet[:2]
plen = len(packet)
while plen - len(packet) < uhl:
sp = SignatureSP(packet)
self[sp.__class__.__name__] = sp
class UserAttributeSubPackets(SubPackets):
"""
This is nearly the same as just the unhashed subpackets from above,
except that there isn't a length specifier. So, parse will only parse one packet,
appending that one packet to self.__unhashed_sp.
"""
_spmodule = userattribute
def __bytearray__(self):
_bytes = bytearray()
for uhsp in self._unhashed_sp.values():
_bytes += uhsp.__bytearray__()
return _bytes
def __len__(self): # pragma: no cover
return sum(len(sp) for sp in self._unhashed_sp.values())
def parse(self, packet):
# parse just one packet and add it to the unhashed subpacket ordereddict
# I actually have yet to come across a User Attribute packet with more than one subpacket
# which makes sense, given that there is only one defined subpacket
sp = UserAttribute(packet)
self[sp.__class__.__name__] = sp
class Signature(MPIs):
def __init__(self):
for i in self.__mpis__:
setattr(self, i, MPI(0))
def __bytearray__(self):
_bytes = bytearray()
for i in self:
_bytes += i.to_mpibytes()
return _bytes
@abc.abstractproperty
def __sig__(self):
"""return the signature bytes in a format that can be understood by the signature verifier"""
@abc.abstractmethod
def from_signer(self, sig):
"""create and parse a concrete Signature class instance"""
class RSASignature(Signature):
__mpis__ = ('md_mod_n', )
def __sig__(self):
return self.md_mod_n.to_mpibytes()[2:]
def parse(self, packet):
self.md_mod_n = MPI(packet)
def from_signer(self, sig):
self.md_mod_n = MPI(self.bytes_to_int(sig))
class DSASignature(Signature):
__mpis__ = ('r', 's')
def __sig__(self):
# return the signature data into an ASN.1 sequence of integers in DER format
seq = Sequence(componentType=NamedTypes(*[NamedType(n, Integer()) for n in self.__mpis__]))
for n in self.__mpis__:
seq.setComponentByName(n, getattr(self, n))
return encoder.encode(seq)
def from_signer(self, sig):
##TODO: just use pyasn1 for this
def _der_intf(_asn):
if _asn[0] != 0x02: # pragma: no cover
raise ValueError("Expected: Integer (0x02). Got: 0x{:02X}".format(_asn[0]))
del _asn[0]
if _asn[0] & 0x80: # pragma: no cover
llen = _asn[0] & 0x7F
del _asn[0]
flen = self.bytes_to_int(_asn[:llen])
del _asn[:llen]
else:
flen = _asn[0] & 0x7F
del _asn[0]
i = self.bytes_to_int(_asn[:flen])
del _asn[:flen]
return i
if isinstance(sig, bytes):
sig = bytearray(sig)
# this is a very limited asn1 decoder - it is only intended to decode a DER encoded sequence of integers
if not sig[0] == 0x30:
raise NotImplementedError("Expected: Sequence (0x30). Got: 0x{:02X}".format(sig[0]))
del sig[0]
# skip the sequence length field
if sig[0] & 0x80: # pragma: no cover
llen = sig[0] & 0x7F
del sig[:llen + 1]
else:
del sig[0]
self.r = MPI(_der_intf(sig))
self.s = MPI(_der_intf(sig))
def parse(self, packet):
self.r = MPI(packet)
self.s = MPI(packet)
class ECDSASignature(DSASignature):
def from_signer(self, sig):
seq, _ = decoder.decode(sig)
self.r = MPI(seq[0])
self.s = MPI(seq[1])
class PubKey(MPIs):
__pubfields__ = ()
@property
def __mpis__(self):
for i in self.__pubfields__:
yield i
def __init__(self):
super(PubKey, self).__init__()
for field in self.__pubfields__:
if isinstance(field, tuple): # pragma: no cover
field, val = field
else:
val = MPI(0)
setattr(self, field, val)
@abc.abstractmethod
def __pubkey__(self):
"""return the requisite *PublicKey class from the cryptography library"""
def __len__(self):
return sum(len(getattr(self, i)) for i in self.__pubfields__)
def __bytearray__(self):
_bytes = bytearray()
for field in self.__pubfields__:
_bytes += getattr(self, field).to_mpibytes()
return _bytes
def publen(self):
return len(self)
def verify(self, subj, sigbytes, hash_alg):
return NotImplemented # pragma: no cover
class OpaquePubKey(PubKey): # pragma: no cover
def __init__(self):
super(OpaquePubKey, self).__init__()
self.data = bytearray()
def __iter__(self):
yield self.data
def __pubkey__(self):
return NotImplemented
def __bytearray__(self):
return self.data
def parse(self, packet):
##TODO: this needs to be length-bounded to the end of the packet
self.data = packet
class RSAPub(PubKey):
__pubfields__ = ('n', 'e')
def __pubkey__(self):
return rsa.RSAPublicNumbers(self.e, self.n).public_key(default_backend())
def verify(self, subj, sigbytes, hash_alg):
# zero-pad sigbytes if necessary
sigbytes = (b'\x00' * (self.n.byte_length() - len(sigbytes))) + sigbytes
verifier = self.__pubkey__().verifier(sigbytes, padding.PKCS1v15(), hash_alg)
verifier.update(subj)
try:
verifier.verify()
except InvalidSignature:
return False
return True
def parse(self, packet):
self.n = MPI(packet)
self.e = MPI(packet)
class DSAPub(PubKey):
__pubfields__ = ('p', 'q', 'g', 'y')
def __pubkey__(self):
params = dsa.DSAParameterNumbers(self.p, self.q, self.g)
return dsa.DSAPublicNumbers(self.y, params).public_key(default_backend())
def verify(self, subj, sigbytes, hash_alg):
verifier = self.__pubkey__().verifier(sigbytes, hash_alg)
verifier.update(subj)
try:
verifier.verify()
except InvalidSignature:
return False
return True
def parse(self, packet):
self.p = MPI(packet)
self.q = MPI(packet)
self.g = MPI(packet)
self.y = MPI(packet)
class ElGPub(PubKey):
__pubfields__ = ('p', 'g', 'y')
def __pubkey__(self):
raise NotImplementedError()
def parse(self, packet):
self.p = MPI(packet)
self.g = MPI(packet)
self.y = MPI(packet)
class ECDSAPub(PubKey):
__pubfields__ = ('x', 'y')
def __init__(self):
super(ECDSAPub, self).__init__()
self.oid = None
def __len__(self):
return sum([len(getattr(self, i)) - 2 for i in self.__pubfields__] +
[3, len(encoder.encode(self.oid.value)) - 1])
def __pubkey__(self):
return ec.EllipticCurvePublicNumbers(self.x, self.y, self.oid.curve()).public_key(default_backend())
def __bytearray__(self):
_b = bytearray()
_b += encoder.encode(self.oid.value)[1:]
# 0x04 || x || y
# where x and y are the same length
_xy = b'\x04' + self.x.to_mpibytes()[2:] + self.y.to_mpibytes()[2:]
_b += MPI(self.bytes_to_int(_xy, 'big')).to_mpibytes()
return _b
def __copy__(self):
pkt = super(ECDSAPub, self).__copy__()
pkt.oid = self.oid
return pkt
def verify(self, subj, sigbytes, hash_alg):
verifier = self.__pubkey__().verifier(sigbytes, ec.ECDSA(hash_alg))
verifier.update(subj)
try:
verifier.verify()
except InvalidSignature:
return False
return True
def parse(self, packet):
oidlen = packet[0]
del packet[0]
_oid = bytearray(b'\x06')
_oid.append(oidlen)
_oid += bytearray(packet[:oidlen])
# try:
oid, _ = decoder.decode(bytes(_oid))
# except:
# raise PGPError("Bad OID octet stream: b'{:s}'".format(''.join(['\\x{:02X}'.format(c) for c in _oid])))
self.oid = EllipticCurveOID(oid)
del packet[:oidlen]
# flen = (self.oid.bit_length // 8)
xy = bytearray(MPI(packet).to_mpibytes()[2:])
# xy = bytearray(MPI(packet).to_bytes(flen, 'big'))
# the first byte is just \x04
del xy[:1]
# now xy needs to be separated into x, y
xylen = len(xy)
x, y = xy[:xylen // 2], xy[xylen // 2:]
self.x = MPI(self.bytes_to_int(x))
self.y = MPI(self.bytes_to_int(y))
class ECDHPub(PubKey):
__pubfields__ = ('x', 'y')
def __init__(self):
super(ECDHPub, self).__init__()
self.oid = None
self.kdf = ECKDF()
def __len__(self):
return sum([len(getattr(self, i)) - 2 for i in self.__pubfields__] +
[3,
len(self.kdf),
len(encoder.encode(self.oid.value)) - 1])
def __pubkey__(self):
return ec.EllipticCurvePublicNumbers(self.x, self.y, self.oid.curve()).public_key(default_backend())
def __bytearray__(self):
_b = bytearray()
_b += encoder.encode(self.oid.value)[1:]
# 0x04 || x || y
# where x and y are the same length
_xy = b'\x04' + self.x.to_mpibytes()[2:] + self.y.to_mpibytes()[2:]
_b += MPI(self.bytes_to_int(_xy, 'big')).to_mpibytes()
_b += self.kdf.__bytearray__()
return _b
def __copy__(self):
pkt = super(ECDHPub, self).__copy__()
pkt.oid = self.oid
pkt.kdf = copy.copy(self.kdf)
return pkt
def parse(self, packet):
"""
Algorithm-Specific Fields for ECDH keys:
o a variable-length field containing a curve OID, formatted
as follows:
- a one-octet size of the following field; values 0 and
0xFF are reserved for future extensions
- the octets representing a curve OID, defined in
Section 11
- MPI of an EC point representing a public key
o a variable-length field containing KDF parameters,
formatted as follows:
- a one-octet size of the following fields; values 0 and
0xff are reserved for future extensions
- a one-octet value 01, reserved for future extensions
- a one-octet hash function ID used with a KDF
- a one-octet algorithm ID for the symmetric algorithm
used to wrap the symmetric key used for the message
encryption; see Section 8 for details
"""
oidlen = packet[0]
del packet[0]
_oid = bytearray(b'\x06')
_oid.append(oidlen)
_oid += bytearray(packet[:oidlen])
# try:
oid, _ = decoder.decode(bytes(_oid))
# except:
# raise PGPError("Bad OID octet stream: b'{:s}'".format(''.join(['\\x{:02X}'.format(c) for c in _oid])))
self.oid = EllipticCurveOID(oid)
del packet[:oidlen]
# flen = (self.oid.bit_length // 8)
xy = bytearray(MPI(packet).to_mpibytes()[2:])
# xy = bytearray(MPI(packet).to_bytes(flen, 'big'))
# the first byte is just \x04
del xy[:1]
# now xy needs to be separated into x, y
xylen = len(xy)
x, y = xy[:xylen // 2], xy[xylen // 2:]
self.x = MPI(self.bytes_to_int(x))
self.y = MPI(self.bytes_to_int(y))
self.kdf.parse(packet)
class String2Key(Field):
"""
3.7. String-to-Key (S2K) Specifiers
String-to-key (S2K) specifiers are used to convert passphrase strings
into symmetric-key encryption/decryption keys. They are used in two
places, currently: to encrypt the secret part of private keys in the
private keyring, and to convert passphrases to encryption keys for
symmetrically encrypted messages.
3.7.1. String-to-Key (S2K) Specifier Types
There are three types of S2K specifiers currently supported, and
some reserved values:
ID S2K Type
-- --------
0 Simple S2K
1 Salted S2K
2 Reserved value
3 Iterated and Salted S2K
100 to 110 Private/Experimental S2K
These are described in Sections 3.7.1.1 - 3.7.1.3.
3.7.1.1. Simple S2K
This directly hashes the string to produce the key data. See below
for how this hashing is done.
Octet 0: 0x00
Octet 1: hash algorithm
Simple S2K hashes the passphrase to produce the session key. The
manner in which this is done depends on the size of the session key
(which will depend on the cipher used) and the size of the hash
algorithm's output. If the hash size is greater than the session key
size, the high-order (leftmost) octets of the hash are used as the
key.
If the hash size is less than the key size, multiple instances of the
hash context are created -- enough to produce the required key data.
These instances are preloaded with 0, 1, 2, ... octets of zeros (that
is to say, the first instance has no preloading, the second gets
preloaded with 1 octet of zero, the third is preloaded with two
octets of zeros, and so forth).
As the data is hashed, it is given independently to each hash
context. Since the contexts have been initialized differently, they
will each produce different hash output. Once the passphrase is
hashed, the output data from the multiple hashes is concatenated,
first hash leftmost, to produce the key data, with any excess octets
on the right discarded.
3.7.1.2. Salted S2K
This includes a "salt" value in the S2K specifier -- some arbitrary
data -- that gets hashed along with the passphrase string, to help
prevent dictionary attacks.
Octet 0: 0x01
Octet 1: hash algorithm
Octets 2-9: 8-octet salt value
Salted S2K is exactly like Simple S2K, except that the input to the
hash function(s) consists of the 8 octets of salt from the S2K
specifier, followed by the passphrase.
3.7.1.3. Iterated and Salted S2K
This includes both a salt and an octet count. The salt is combined
with the passphrase and the resulting value is hashed repeatedly.
This further increases the amount of work an attacker must do to try
dictionary attacks.
Octet 0: 0x03
Octet 1: hash algorithm
Octets 2-9: 8-octet salt value
Octet 10: count, a one-octet, coded value
The count is coded into a one-octet number using the following
formula:
#define EXPBIAS 6
count = ((Int32)16 + (c & 15)) << ((c >> 4) + EXPBIAS);
The above formula is in C, where "Int32" is a type for a 32-bit
integer, and the variable "c" is the coded count, Octet 10.
Iterated-Salted S2K hashes the passphrase and salt data multiple
times. The total number of octets to be hashed is specified in the
encoded count in the S2K specifier. Note that the resulting count
value is an octet count of how many octets will be hashed, not an
iteration count.
Initially, one or more hash contexts are set up as with the other S2K
algorithms, depending on how many octets of key data are needed.
Then the salt, followed by the passphrase data, is repeatedly hashed
until the number of octets specified by the octet count has been
hashed. The one exception is that if the octet count is less than
the size of the salt plus passphrase, the full salt plus passphrase
will be hashed even though that is greater than the octet count.
After the hashing is done, the data is unloaded from the hash
context(s) as with the other S2K algorithms.
"""
@sdproperty
def encalg(self):
return self._encalg
@encalg.register(int)
@encalg.register(SymmetricKeyAlgorithm)
def encalg_int(self, val):
self._encalg = SymmetricKeyAlgorithm(val)
@sdproperty
def specifier(self):
return self._specifier
@specifier.register(int)
@specifier.register(String2KeyType)
def specifier_int(self, val):
self._specifier = String2KeyType(val)
@sdproperty
def halg(self):
return self._halg
@halg.register(int)
@halg.register(HashAlgorithm)
def halg_int(self, val):
self._halg = HashAlgorithm(val)
@sdproperty
def count(self):
return (16 + (self._count & 15)) << ((self._count >> 4) + 6)
@count.register(int)
def count_int(self, val):
if val < 0 or val > 255: # pragma: no cover
raise ValueError("count must be between 0 and 256")
self._count = val
def __init__(self):
super(String2Key, self).__init__()
self.usage = 0
self.encalg = 0
self.specifier = 0
self.iv = None
# specifier-specific fields
# simple, salted, iterated
self.halg = 0
# salted, iterated
self.salt = bytearray()
# iterated
self.count = 0
def __bytearray__(self):
_bytes = bytearray()
_bytes.append(self.usage)
if bool(self):
_bytes.append(self.encalg)
_bytes.append(self.specifier)
if self.specifier >= String2KeyType.Simple:
_bytes.append(self.halg)
if self.specifier >= String2KeyType.Salted:
_bytes += self.salt
if self.specifier == String2KeyType.Iterated:
_bytes.append(self._count)
if self.iv is not None:
_bytes += self.iv
return _bytes
def __len__(self):
return len(self.__bytearray__())
def __bool__(self):
return self.usage in [254, 255]
def __nonzero__(self):
return self.__bool__()
def __copy__(self):
s2k = String2Key()
s2k.usage = self.usage
s2k.encalg = self.encalg
s2k.specifier = self.specifier
s2k.iv = self.iv
s2k.halg = self.halg
s2k.salt = copy.copy(self.salt)
s2k.count = self._count
return s2k
def parse(self, packet, iv=True):
self.usage = packet[0]
del packet[0]
if bool(self):
self.encalg = packet[0]
del packet[0]
self.specifier = packet[0]
del packet[0]
if self.specifier >= String2KeyType.Simple:
# this will always be true
self.halg = packet[0]
del packet[0]
if self.specifier >= String2KeyType.Salted:
self.salt = packet[:8]
del packet[:8]
if self.specifier == String2KeyType.Iterated:
self.count = packet[0]
del packet[0]
if iv:
self.iv = packet[:(self.encalg.block_size // 8)]
del packet[:(self.encalg.block_size // 8)]
def derive_key(self, passphrase):
##TODO: raise an exception if self.usage is not 254 or 255
keylen = self.encalg.key_size
hashlen = self.halg.digest_size * 8
ctx = int(math.ceil((keylen / hashlen)))
# Simple S2K - always done
hsalt = b''
hpass = passphrase.encode('latin-1')
# salted, iterated S2K
if self.specifier >= String2KeyType.Salted:
hsalt = bytes(self.salt)
count = len(hsalt + hpass)
if self.specifier == String2KeyType.Iterated and self.count > len(hsalt + hpass):
count = self.count
hcount = (count // len(hsalt + hpass))
hleft = count - (hcount * len(hsalt + hpass))
hashdata = ((hsalt + hpass) * hcount) + (hsalt + hpass)[:hleft]
h = []
for i in range(0, ctx):
_h = self.halg.hasher
_h.update(b'\x00' * i)
_h.update(hashdata)
h.append(_h)
# GC some stuff
del hsalt
del hpass
del hashdata
# and return the key!
return b''.join(hc.digest() for hc in h)[:(keylen // 8)]
class ECKDF(Field):
"""
o a variable-length field containing KDF parameters,
formatted as follows:
- a one-octet size of the following fields; values 0 and
0xff are reserved for future extensions
- a one-octet value 01, reserved for future extensions
- a one-octet hash function ID used with a KDF
- a one-octet algorithm ID for the symmetric algorithm
used to wrap the symmetric key used for the message
encryption; see Section 8 for details
"""
@sdproperty
def halg(self):
return self._halg
@halg.register(int)
@halg.register(HashAlgorithm)
def halg_int(self, val):
self._halg = HashAlgorithm(val)
@sdproperty
def encalg(self):
return self._encalg
@encalg.register(int)
@encalg.register(SymmetricKeyAlgorithm)
def encalg_int(self, val):
self._encalg = SymmetricKeyAlgorithm(val)
def __init__(self):
super(ECKDF, self).__init__()
self.halg = 0
self.encalg = 0
def __bytearray__(self):
_bytes = bytearray()
_bytes.append(len(self) - 1)
_bytes.append(0x01)
_bytes.append(self.halg)
_bytes.append(self.encalg)
return _bytes
def __len__(self):
return 4
def parse(self, packet):
# packet[0] should always be 3
# packet[1] should always be 1
# TODO: this assert is likely not necessary, but we should raise some kind of exception
# if parsing fails due to these fields being incorrect
assert packet[:2] == b'\x03\x01'
del packet[:2]
self.halg = packet[0]
del packet[0]
self.encalg = packet[0]
del packet[0]
def derive_key(self, s, curve, pkalg, fingerprint):
# wrapper around the Concatenation KDF method provided by cryptography
# assemble the additional data as defined in RFC 6637:
# Param = curve_OID_len || curve_OID || public_key_alg_ID || 03 || 01 || KDF_hash_ID || KEK_alg_ID for AESKeyWrap || "Anonymous
data = bytearray()
data += encoder.encode(curve.value)[1:]
data.append(pkalg)
data += b'\x03\x01'
data.append(self.halg)
data.append(self.encalg)
data += b'Anonymous Sender '
data += binascii.unhexlify(fingerprint.replace(' ', ''))
ckdf = ConcatKDFHash(algorithm=getattr(hashes, self.halg.name)(), length=self.encalg.key_size // 8, otherinfo=bytes(data), backend=default_backend())
return ckdf.derive(s)
class PrivKey(PubKey):
__privfields__ = ()
@property
def __mpis__(self):
for i in super(PrivKey, self).__mpis__:
yield i
for i in self.__privfields__:
yield i
def __init__(self):
super(PrivKey, self).__init__()
self.s2k = String2Key()
self.encbytes = bytearray()
self.chksum = bytearray()
for field in self.__privfields__:
setattr(self, field, MPI(0))
def __bytearray__(self):
_bytes = bytearray()
_bytes += super(PrivKey, self).__bytearray__()
_bytes += self.s2k.__bytearray__()
if self.s2k:
_bytes += self.encbytes
else:
for field in self.__privfields__:
_bytes += getattr(self, field).to_mpibytes()
if self.s2k.usage == 0:
_bytes += self.chksum
return _bytes
def __len__(self):
l = super(PrivKey, self).__len__() + len(self.s2k) + len(self.chksum)
if self.s2k:
l += len(self.encbytes)
else:
l += sum(len(getattr(self, i)) for i in self.__privfields__)
return l
def __copy__(self):
pk = super(PrivKey, self).__copy__()
pk.s2k = copy.copy(self.s2k)
pk.encbytes = copy.copy(self.encbytes)
pk.chksum = copy.copy(self.chksum)
return pk
@abc.abstractmethod
def __privkey__(self):
"""return the requisite *PrivateKey class from the cryptography library"""
@abc.abstractmethod
def _generate(self, key_size):
"""Generate a new PrivKey"""
def _compute_chksum(self):
"Calculate the key checksum"
def publen(self):
return super(PrivKey, self).__len__()
def encrypt_keyblob(self, passphrase, enc_alg, hash_alg):
# PGPy will only ever use iterated and salted S2k mode
self.s2k.usage = 254
self.s2k.encalg = enc_alg
self.s2k.specifier = String2KeyType.Iterated
self.s2k.iv = enc_alg.gen_iv()
self.s2k.halg = hash_alg
self.s2k.salt = bytearray(os.urandom(8))
self.s2k.count = hash_alg.tuned_count
# now that String-to-Key is ready to go, derive sessionkey from passphrase
# and then unreference passphrase
sessionkey = self.s2k.derive_key(passphrase)
del passphrase
pt = bytearray()
for pf in self.__privfields__:
pt += getattr(self, pf).to_mpibytes()
# append a SHA-1 hash of the plaintext so far to the plaintext
pt += hashlib.new('sha1', pt).digest()
# encrypt
self.encbytes = bytearray(_encrypt(bytes(pt), bytes(sessionkey), enc_alg, bytes(self.s2k.iv)))
# delete pt and clear self
del pt
self.clear()
@abc.abstractmethod
def decrypt_keyblob(self, passphrase):
if not self.s2k: # pragma: no cover
# not encrypted
return
# Encryption/decryption of the secret data is done in CFB mode using
# the key created from the passphrase and the Initial Vector from the
# packet. A different mode is used with V3 keys (which are only RSA)
# than with other key formats. (...)
#
# With V4 keys, a simpler method is used. All secret MPI values are
# encrypted in CFB mode, including the MPI bitcount prefix.
# derive the session key from our passphrase, and then unreference passphrase
sessionkey = self.s2k.derive_key(passphrase)
del passphrase
# attempt to decrypt this key
pt = _decrypt(bytes(self.encbytes), bytes(sessionkey), self.s2k.encalg, bytes(self.s2k.iv))
# check the hash to see if we decrypted successfully or not
if self.s2k.usage == 254 and not pt[-20:] == hashlib.new('sha1', pt[:-20]).digest():
# if the usage byte is 254, key material is followed by a 20-octet sha-1 hash of the rest
# of the key material block
raise PGPDecryptionError("Passphrase was incorrect!")
if self.s2k.usage == 255 and not self.bytes_to_int(pt[-2:]) == (sum(bytearray(pt[:-2])) % 65536): # pragma: no cover
# if the usage byte is 255, key material is followed by a 2-octet checksum of the rest
# of the key material block
raise PGPDecryptionError("Passphrase was incorrect!")
return bytearray(pt)
def sign(self, sigdata, hash_alg):
return NotImplemented # pragma: no cover
def clear(self):
"""delete and re-initialize all private components to zero"""
for field in self.__privfields__:
delattr(self, field)
setattr(self, field, MPI(0))
class OpaquePrivKey(PrivKey, OpaquePubKey): # pragma: no cover
def __privkey__(self):
return NotImplemented
def _generate(self, key_size):
# return NotImplemented
raise NotImplementedError()
def decrypt_keyblob(self, passphrase):
return NotImplemented
class RSAPriv(PrivKey, RSAPub):
__privfields__ = ('d', 'p', 'q', 'u')
def __privkey__(self):
return rsa.RSAPrivateNumbers(self.p, self.q, self.d,
rsa.rsa_crt_dmp1(self.d, self.p),
rsa.rsa_crt_dmq1(self.d, self.q),
rsa.rsa_crt_iqmp(self.p, self.q),
rsa.RSAPublicNumbers(self.e, self.n)).private_key(default_backend())
def _compute_chksum(self):
chs = sum(sum(bytearray(c.to_mpibytes())) for c in (self.d, self.p, self.q, self.u)) % 65536
self.chksum = bytearray(self.int_to_bytes(chs, 2))
def _generate(self, key_size):
if any(c != 0 for c in self): # pragma: no cover
raise PGPError("key is already populated")
# generate some big numbers!
pk = rsa.generate_private_key(65537, key_size, default_backend())
pkn = pk.private_numbers()
self.n = MPI(pkn.public_numbers.n)
self.e = MPI(pkn.public_numbers.e)
self.d = MPI(pkn.d)
self.p = MPI(pkn.p)
self.q = MPI(pkn.q)
# from the RFC:
# "- MPI of u, the multiplicative inverse of p, mod q."
# or, simply, p^-1 mod p
# rsa.rsa_crt_iqmp(p, q) normally computes q^-1 mod p,
# so if we swap the values around we get the answer we want
self.u = MPI(rsa.rsa_crt_iqmp(pkn.q, pkn.p))
del pkn
del pk
self._compute_chksum()
def parse(self, packet):
super(RSAPriv, self).parse(packet)
self.s2k.parse(packet)
if not self.s2k:
self.d = MPI(packet)
self.p = MPI(packet)
self.q = MPI(packet)
self.u = MPI(packet)
if self.s2k.usage == 0:
self.chksum = packet[:2]
del packet[:2]
else:
##TODO: this needs to be bounded to the length of the encrypted key material
self.encbytes = packet
def decrypt_keyblob(self, passphrase):
kb = super(RSAPriv, self).decrypt_keyblob(passphrase)
del passphrase
self.d = MPI(kb)
self.p = MPI(kb)
self.q = MPI(kb)
self.u = MPI(kb)
if self.s2k.usage in [254, 255]:
self.chksum = kb
del kb
def sign(self, sigdata, hash_alg):
signer = self.__privkey__().signer(padding.PKCS1v15(), hash_alg)
signer.update(sigdata)
return signer.finalize()
class DSAPriv(PrivKey, DSAPub):
__privfields__ = ('x',)
def __privkey__(self):
params = dsa.DSAParameterNumbers(self.p, self.q, self.g)
pn = dsa.DSAPublicNumbers(self.y, params)
return dsa.DSAPrivateNumbers(self.x, pn).private_key(default_backend())
def _compute_chksum(self):
chs = sum(bytearray(self.x.to_mpibytes())) % 65536
self.chksum = bytearray(self.int_to_bytes(chs, 2))
def _generate(self, key_size):
if any(c != 0 for c in self): # pragma: no cover
raise PGPError("key is already populated")
# generate some big numbers!
pk = dsa.generate_private_key(key_size, default_backend())
pkn = pk.private_numbers()
self.p = MPI(pkn.public_numbers.parameter_numbers.p)
self.q = MPI(pkn.public_numbers.parameter_numbers.q)
self.g = MPI(pkn.public_numbers.parameter_numbers.g)
self.y = MPI(pkn.public_numbers.y)
self.x = MPI(pkn.x)
del pkn
del pk
self._compute_chksum()
def parse(self, packet):
super(DSAPriv, self).parse(packet)
self.s2k.parse(packet)
if not self.s2k:
self.x = MPI(packet)
else:
self.encbytes = packet
if self.s2k.usage in [0, 255]:
self.chksum = packet[:2]
del packet[:2]
def decrypt_keyblob(self, passphrase):
kb = super(DSAPriv, self).decrypt_keyblob(passphrase)
del passphrase
self.x = MPI(kb)
if self.s2k.usage in [254, 255]:
self.chksum = kb
del kb
def sign(self, sigdata, hash_alg):
signer = self.__privkey__().signer(hash_alg)
signer.update(sigdata)
return signer.finalize()
class ElGPriv(PrivKey, ElGPub):
__privfields__ = ('x', )
def __privkey__(self):
raise NotImplementedError()
def _compute_chksum(self):
chs = sum(bytearray(self.x.to_mpibytes())) % 65536
self.chksum = bytearray(self.int_to_bytes(chs, 2))
def _generate(self, key_size):
raise NotImplementedError(PubKeyAlgorithm.ElGamal)
def parse(self, packet):
super(ElGPriv, self).parse(packet)
self.s2k.parse(packet)
if not self.s2k:
self.x = MPI(packet)
else:
self.encbytes = packet
if self.s2k.usage in [0, 255]:
self.chksum = packet[:2]
del packet[:2]
def decrypt_keyblob(self, passphrase):
kb = super(ElGPriv, self).decrypt_keyblob(passphrase)
del passphrase
self.x = MPI(kb)
if self.s2k.usage in [254, 255]:
self.chksum = kb
del kb
class ECDSAPriv(PrivKey, ECDSAPub):
__privfields__ = ('s', )
def __privkey__(self):
ecp = ec.EllipticCurvePublicNumbers(self.x, self.y, self.oid.curve())
return ec.EllipticCurvePrivateNumbers(self.s, ecp).private_key(default_backend())
def _compute_chksum(self):
chs = sum(bytearray(self.s.to_mpibytes())) % 65536
self.chksum = bytearray(self.int_to_bytes(chs, 2))
def _generate(self, oid):
if any(c != 0 for c in self): # pragma: no cover
raise PGPError("Key is already populated!")
self.oid = EllipticCurveOID(oid)
if not self.oid.can_gen:
raise ValueError("Curve not currently supported: {}".format(oid.name))
pk = ec.generate_private_key(self.oid.curve(), default_backend())
pubn = pk.public_key().public_numbers()
self.x = MPI(pubn.x)
self.y = MPI(pubn.y)
self.s = MPI(pk.private_numbers().private_value)
self._compute_chksum()
def parse(self, packet):
super(ECDSAPriv, self).parse(packet)
self.s2k.parse(packet)
if not self.s2k:
self.s = MPI(packet)
if self.s2k.usage == 0:
self.chksum = packet[:2]
del packet[:2]
else:
##TODO: this needs to be bounded to the length of the encrypted key material
self.encbytes = packet
def decrypt_keyblob(self, passphrase):
kb = super(ECDSAPriv, self).decrypt_keyblob(passphrase)
del passphrase
self.s = MPI(kb)
def sign(self, sigdata, hash_alg):
signer = self.__privkey__().signer(ec.ECDSA(hash_alg))
signer.update(sigdata)
return signer.finalize()
class ECDHPriv(ECDSAPriv, ECDHPub):
def __bytearray__(self):
_b = ECDHPub.__bytearray__(self)
_b += self.s2k.__bytearray__()
if not self.s2k:
_b += self.s.to_mpibytes()
if self.s2k.usage == 0:
_b += self.chksum
else:
_b += self.encbytes
return _b
def __len__(self):
# because of the inheritance used for this, ECDSAPub.__len__ is called instead of ECDHPub.__len__
# the only real difference is self.kdf, so we can just add that
return super(ECDHPriv, self).__len__() + len(self.kdf)
def _generate(self, oid):
ECDSAPriv._generate(self, oid)
self.kdf.halg = self.oid.kdf_halg
self.kdf.encalg = self.oid.kek_alg
def publen(self):
return ECDHPub.__len__(self)
def parse(self, packet):
ECDHPub.parse(self, packet)
self.s2k.parse(packet)
if not self.s2k:
self.s = MPI(packet)
if self.s2k.usage == 0:
self.chksum = packet[:2]
del packet[:2]
else:
##TODO: this needs to be bounded to the length of the encrypted key material
self.encbytes = packet
class CipherText(MPIs):
def __init__(self):
super(CipherText, self).__init__()
for i in self.__mpis__:
setattr(self, i, MPI(0))
@classmethod
@abc.abstractmethod
def encrypt(cls, encfn, *args):
"""create and populate a concrete CipherText class instance"""
@abc.abstractmethod
def decrypt(self, decfn, *args):
"""decrypt the ciphertext contained in this CipherText instance"""
def __bytearray__(self):
_bytes = bytearray()
for i in self:
_bytes += i.to_mpibytes()
return _bytes
class RSACipherText(CipherText):
__mpis__ = ('me_mod_n', )
@classmethod
def encrypt(cls, encfn, *args):
ct = cls()
ct.me_mod_n = MPI(cls.bytes_to_int(encfn(*args)))
return ct
def decrypt(self, decfn, *args):
return decfn(*args)
def parse(self, packet):
self.me_mod_n = MPI(packet)
class ElGCipherText(CipherText):
__mpis__ = ('gk_mod_p', 'myk_mod_p')
@classmethod
def encrypt(cls, encfn, *args):
raise NotImplementedError()
def decrypt(self, decfn, *args):
raise NotImplementedError()
def parse(self, packet):
self.gk_mod_p = MPI(packet)
self.myk_mod_p = MPI(packet)
class ECDHCipherText(CipherText):
__mpis__ = ('vX', 'vY')
@classmethod
def encrypt(cls, pk, *args):
"""
For convenience, the synopsis of the encoding method is given below;
however, this section, [NIST-SP800-56A], and [RFC3394] are the
normative sources of the definition.
Obtain the authenticated recipient public key R
Generate an ephemeral key pair {v, V=vG}
Compute the shared point S = vR;
m = symm_alg_ID || session key || checksum || pkcs5_padding;
curve_OID_len = (byte)len(curve_OID);
Param = curve_OID_len || curve_OID || public_key_alg_ID || 03
|| 01 || KDF_hash_ID || KEK_alg_ID for AESKeyWrap || "Anonymous
Sender " || recipient_fingerprint;
Z_len = the key size for the KEK_alg_ID used with AESKeyWrap
Compute Z = KDF( S, Z_len, Param );
Compute C = AESKeyWrap( Z, m ) as per [RFC3394]
VB = convert point V to the octet string
Output (MPI(VB) || len(C) || C).
The decryption is the inverse of the method given. Note that the
recipient obtains the shared secret by calculating
"""
# *args should be:
# - m
#
_m, = args
# m may need to be PKCS5-padded
padder = PKCS7(64).padder()
m = padder.update(_m) + padder.finalize()
km = pk.keymaterial
ct = cls()
# generate ephemeral key pair, then store it in ct
v = ec.generate_private_key(km.oid.curve(), default_backend())
ct.vX = MPI(v.public_key().public_numbers().x)
ct.vY = MPI(v.public_key().public_numbers().y)
# compute the shared point S
s = v.exchange(ec.ECDH(), km.__pubkey__())
# derive the wrapping key
z = km.kdf.derive_key(s, km.oid, PubKeyAlgorithm.ECDH, pk.fingerprint)
# compute C
ct.c = aes_key_wrap(z, m, default_backend())
return ct
def decrypt(self, pk, *args):
km = pk.keymaterial
# assemble the public component of ephemeral key v
v = ec.EllipticCurvePublicNumbers(self.vX, self.vY, km.oid.curve()).public_key(default_backend())
# compute s using the inverse of how it was derived during encryption
s = km.__privkey__().exchange(ec.ECDH(), v)
# derive the wrapping key
z = km.kdf.derive_key(s, km.oid, PubKeyAlgorithm.ECDH, pk.fingerprint)
# unwrap and unpad m
_m = aes_key_unwrap(z, self.c, default_backend())
padder = PKCS7(64).unpadder()
return padder.update(_m) + padder.finalize()
def __init__(self):
super(ECDHCipherText, self).__init__()
self.c = bytearray(0)
def __bytearray__(self):
_bytes = bytearray()
_xy = b'\x04' + self.vX.to_mpibytes()[2:] + self.vY.to_mpibytes()[2:]
_bytes += MPI(self.bytes_to_int(_xy, 'big')).to_mpibytes()
_bytes.append(len(self.c))
_bytes += self.c
return _bytes
def parse(self, packet):
# self.v = MPI(packet)
xy = bytearray(MPI(packet).to_mpibytes()[2:])
del xy[:1]
xylen = len(xy)
x, y = xy[:xylen // 2], xy[xylen // 2:]
self.vX = MPI(self.bytes_to_int(x))
self.vY = MPI(self.bytes_to_int(y))
clen = packet[0]
del packet[0]
self.c += packet[:clen]
del packet[:clen]
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