/usr/bin/mailhelp is in mailagent 1:3.1-81-4+b1.
This file is owned by root:root, with mode 0o755.
The actual contents of the file can be viewed below.
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eval 'exec perl -S $0 ${1+"$@"}'
if $running_under_some_shell;
# $Id: mailhelp.SH 75 2011-12-23 10:18:37Z rmanfredi $
#
# Copyright (c) 1990-2006, Raphael Manfredi
#
# You may redistribute only under the terms of the Artistic License,
# as specified in the README file that comes with the distribution.
# You may reuse parts of this distribution only within the terms of
# that same Artistic License; a copy of which may be found at the root
# of the source tree for mailagent 3.0.
#
# $Log: mailhelp.SH,v $
# Revision 3.0.1.3 1996/12/24 14:07:01 ram
# patch45: silently discard hostile addresses
#
# Revision 3.0.1.2 1995/03/21 12:55:04 ram
# patch35: added pl/cdir.pl to the list of appended files
#
# Revision 3.0.1.1 1994/10/04 17:36:31 ram
# patch17: extended logging to get better error/failure tracking
#
# Revision 3.0 1993/11/29 13:48:23 ram
# Baseline for mailagent 3.0 netwide release.
#
$mversion = '3.1';
$patchlevel = '0';
$revision = '81';
$prog_name = $0; # Who I am
$prog_name =~ s|^.*/(.*)|$1|; # Keep only base name
&read_config; # First, read configuration file (in ~/.mailagent)
# take job number and command from environment
# (passed by mailagent)
$jobnum = $ENV{'jobnum'};
$fullcmd = $ENV{'fullcmd'};
$dest=shift; # Who should the help be sent to
$dest = $ENV{'path'} if $dest eq ''; # If dest was omitted
# A single '-' as first argument stands for return path
$dest = $ENV{'path'} if $dest eq '-';
# Silently discard hostile addresses
unless (&addr'valid($dest)) {
&add_log("FAILED (HOSTILE $dest)") if $loglvl > 1;
exit 0;
}
open(HELP, "$cf'spool/agenthelp") || &fatal("no help file!\n");
open(MAILER, "|$cf'sendmail $cf'mailopt $dest") || &nofork;
print MAILER
"To: $dest
Subject: How to use my mail agent
X-Mailer: mailagent [version $mversion-$revision]
";
while (<HELP>) {
# Replace some tokens by parameters
s/=DEST=/$dest/g;
s/=MAXSIZE=/$cf'maxsize/g;
print MAILER;
}
print MAILER
"
-- $prog_name speaking for $cf'user
";
close MAILER;
if ($?) {
&add_log("ERROR couldn't send help to $dest") if $loglvl > 0;
} else {
&add_log("SENT help to $dest") if $loglvl > 2;
}
close HELP;
# Report error while forking a sendmail process
sub nofork {
&add_log("SYSERR fork: $!") if $loglvl;
&add_log("ERROR cannot launch $cf'sendmail") if $loglvl;
}
# In case of fatal error, the program does not simply die
# but also records the failure in the log.
sub fatal {
local($reason) = @_; # Why did we get here ?
&add_log("FAILED ($reason)") if $loglvl > 0;
die "$prog_name: $reason\n";
}
# Emergency signal was caught
sub emergency {
local($sig) = @_; # First argument is signal name
&fatal("trapped SIG$sig");
}
# Add an entry to logfile
# There is no need to lock logfile as print is sandwiched betweeen
# an open and a close (kernel will flush at the end of the file).
sub add_log {
# Indirection needed, so that we may remap add_log on stderr_log via a
# type glob assignment.
&usrlog'write_log($cf'logfile, $_[0], undef);
}
# When mailagent is used interactively, log messages are also printed on
# the standard error.
# NB: this function is not called directly, but via a type glob *add_log.
sub stderr_log {
print STDERR "$prog_name: $_[0]\n";
&usrlog'write_log($cf'logfile, $_[0], undef);
}
# Routine used to emit logs when no logging has been configured yet.
# As soon as a valid configuration has been loaded, logs will also be
# duplicated into the logfile. Used solely by &cf'setup.
# NB: this function is not called directly, but via a type glob *add_log.
sub stdout_log {
print STDOUT "$prog_name: $_[0]\n";
&usrlog'write_log($cf'logfile, $_[0], undef) if defined $cf'logfile;
}
#
# User-defined log files
#
package usrlog;
# Record a new logfile by storing its pathname in the %Logpath hash table
# indexed by names and the carbon-copy flag in the %Cc table.
sub new {
local($name, $path, $cc) = @_;
return if defined $Logpath{$name}; # Logfile already recorded
return if $name eq 'default'; # Cannot redefined defaul log
$path = "$cf'logdir/$path" unless $path =~ m|^/|;
$Logpath{$name} = $path; # Where logfile should be stored
$Cc{$name} = $cc ? 1 : 0; # Should we cc the default logfile?
$Map{$path} = $name; # Two-way hash table
}
# Delete user-defined logfile.
sub delete {
local($name) = @_;
return unless defined $Logpath{$name};
local($path) = $Logpath{$name};
delete $Logpath{$name};
delete $Cc{$name};
delete $Map{$path};
}
# User-level logging main entry point
sub main'usr_log {
local($name, $message) = @_; # Logfile name and message to be logged
local($file);
$file = ($name eq 'default' || !defined $Logpath{$name}) ?
$cf'logfile : $Logpath{$name};
&write_log($file, $message, $Cc{$name});
}
# Log message into logfile, using jobnum to identify process.
sub write_log {
local($file, $msg, $cc) = @_; # Logfile, message to be logged, cc flag
local($date);
local($log);
return unless length $file;
local ($sec,$min,$hour,$mday,$mon,$year,$wday,$yday,$isdst) =
localtime(time);
$date = sprintf("%.2d/%.2d/%.2d %.2d:%.2d:%.2d",
$year % 100,++$mon,$mday,$hour,$min,$sec);
$log = $date . " $'prog_name\[$'jobnum\]: $msg\n";
# If we cannot append to the logfile, first check whether it is the default
# logfile or not. If it is not, then add a log entry to state the error in
# the default log and then delete that user logname entry, assuming the
# fault we get is of a permanent nature and not an NFS failure for instance.
unless (open(LOGFILE, ">>$file")) {
if ($file ne $cf'logfile) {
local($name) = $Map{$file}; # Name under which it was registered
&'add_log("ERROR cannot append to $name logfile $file: $!")
if $'loglvl > 1;
&'add_log("NOTICE removing logging to $file") if $'loglvl > 6;
&delete($Map{$file});
$cc = 1; # Force logging to default file
} else { # We were already writing to default log
return; # Cannot log message at all
}
}
print LOGFILE $log;
close LOGFILE;
# If $cc is set, a copy of the same log message (same time stamp guaranteed)
# is made to the default logfile. If called with $file set to that default
# logfile, $cc will be undef by construction.
if ($cc) {
open(LOGFILE, ">>$cf'logfile");
print LOGFILE $log;
close LOGFILE;
}
}
package main;
package cf;
# This package is responsible for keeping track of the configuration variables.
# Read configuration file (usually in ~/.mailagent)
sub main'read_config {
local($file) = @_; # where config file is located
local($_);
$file = '~/.mailagent' unless $file;
local($myhome) = $ENV{'HOME'}; # must be correctly set by filter
$file =~ s/~/$myhome/; # ~ substitution
local($main'config) = $file; # Save it: could be modified by config
open(CONFIG, "$file") ||
&'fatal("can't open config file $file");
local($config) = ' ' x 2000; # pre-extend to avoid realloc()
$config = '';
while (<CONFIG>) {
next if /^[ \t]*#/; # skip comments
next if /^[ \t]*\n/; # skip empy lines
s/([^\\](\\\\)*)@/$1\\@/g; # escape all un-escaped @ in string
$config .= $_;
}
&parse($config) || &'fatal('bad configuration');
close CONFIG;
# Security checks, pending of those performed by the C filter. They are
# somewhat necessary, even though the mailagent does not run setuid
# (because anybody may activate the mailagent for any user by sending him
# a mail, and world writable configuration files makes the task too easy
# for a potential hacker). The tests are performed once the configuration
# file has been parsed, so logging of fatal errors may occur.
local($unsecure) = 0;
$unsecure++ unless &'file_secure($'config, 'config');
$unsecure++ unless &'file_secure($rules, 'rule');
&'fatal("unsecure configuration!") if $unsecure;
return unless -f "$rules"; # No rule file
}
# Parse config file held in variable and return 1 if ok, 0 for errors
sub parse {
local($config) = @_;
return 1 unless defined $config;
local($eval) = ' ' x 1000; # Pre-extend
local($myhome) = $ENV{'HOME'}; # must be correctly set by filter
local($var, $value);
local($_);
$eval = '';
foreach (split(/\n/, $config)) {
if (/^[ \t]*([^ \t\n:\/]*)[ \t]*:[ \t]*([^#\n]*)/) {
$var = $1;
$value = $2;
$value =~ s/\s*$//; # remove trailing spaces
$eval .= "\$$var = \"$value\";\n";
$eval .= "\$$var =~ s|~|\$myhome|g;\n"; # ~ substitution
}
}
eval $eval; # evaluate configuration parameters within package
if ($@ ne '') { # Parsing error detected
local($error) = $@; # Logged error
$error = (split(/\n/, $error))[0]; # Keep only first line
# Dump error message on stderr, as well as faulty configuration file.
# The original is restored out of the perl form to avoid surprise.
$eval =~ s/^\$.* =~ s\|~\|.*\n//gm; # Remove added ~ substitutions
$eval =~ s/^\$//gm; # Remove leading '$'
$eval =~ s/ = "(.*)";/: $1/gm; # Keep only variable value
chop($eval);
print STDERR <<EOM;
**** Syntax error in configuration:
$error
---- Begin of Faulty Configuration
$eval
---- End of Faulty Configuration
EOM
&'add_log("syntax error in configuration: $error") if $'loglvl > 1;
return 0;
}
# Define the mailagent parameters from those in config file
$logfile = $logdir . "/$log";
$seqfile = $spool . "/$seq";
$hashdir = $spool . "/$hash";
$main'loglvl = int($level); # This one is visible in the main package
$main'track_all = 1 if $track =~ /on/i; # Option -t set by config
$sendmail = $'mailer if $sendmail eq ''; # No sendmail program specified
$sendnews = $'inews if $sendnews eq ''; # No news posting program
$mailopt = '-odq -i' if $mailopt eq '' && $sendmail =~ /sendmail/;
# Backward compatibility -- RAM, 25/04/94
$fromesc = 'ON' unless defined $fromesc; # If absent from ~/.mailagent
$lockmax = 20 unless defined $lockmax;
$lockdelay = 2 unless defined $lockdelay;
$lockhold = 3600 unless defined $lockhold;
$queuewait = 60 unless defined $queuewait;
$queuehold = 1800 unless defined $queuehold;
$queuelost = 86400 unless defined $queuelost;
$runmax = 3600 unless defined $runmax;
$umask = 077 unless defined $umask;
$email = $user unless defined $email;
$compspec = "$spool/compressors" unless defined $compspec;
$comptag = 'gzip' unless defined $comptag;
$locksafe = 'OFF' unless defined $locksafe;
$execsafe = 'OFF' unless defined $execsafe;
# For backward compatibility, we force a .lock locking on mailboxes.
# For system ones (name = login), there's no problem because the lock
# file is still under the 14 characters limit. If mail is saved in folders
# whose name is longer, there might be problems though. There's little we
# can do about it here, lest they choose an alternate locking name.
# Note that mailagent's $lockext global variable setting depends on the
# fact that the target system supports flexible filenames or not, so only
# mailbox locking is a problem -- RAM, 18/07/95
$mboxlock = '%f.lock' unless defined $mboxlock;
# Backward compatibility -- RAM, 17/03/2001
$domain = $main::hiddennet || $main::mydomain unless defined $domain;
$hidenet = $main::hiddennet eq '' ? 'OFF' : 'ON' unless defined $hidenet;
$umask = oct($umask) if $umask =~ /^0/; # Translate umask into decimal
$domain =~ s/^\.*//; # Strip leading '.'
# Update @INC perlib search path with the perlib variable. Paths not
# starting by a '/' are supposed to be under the mailagent private lib
# directory.
local(%seen); # Avoid dups in @INC (might be called more than once)
foreach (@INC) { $seen{$_}++; }
if (defined $perlib) {
foreach (split(':', $perlib)) {
s/^~/$home/;
$_ = $'privlib . '/' . $_ unless m|^/|;
push(@INC, $_) unless $seen{$_}++;
}
}
1; # Ok
}
package main;
# A file "secure" if it is owned by the user and not world writable. Some key
# file within the mailagent have to be kept secure or they might compromise the
# security of the user account.
#
# Additionally, for 'root' users or if the 'secure' parameter in the config
# file is set to ON, checks are made for group writable files and suspicious
# directory as well.
#
# Return true if the file is secure or missing, false otherwise.
# Note the extra parameter $exec which is set by exec_secure() only.
sub file_secure {
local($file, $type, $exec) = @_;
return 1 unless -e $file; # Missing file considered secure
# If we're trying to execute a symbolic link, try to resolve it recursively
# Otherwise, symlinks are not considered secure by file_secure().
if (-l $file) { # File is a symbolic link
if ($exec) {
local($target);
$target = &symfile_secure($file, $type);
return 0 unless defined $target;
&add_log("NOTICE running $type $file actually runs $target")
if $loglvl > 6;
$file = $target;
} else {
&add_log("WARNING sensitive $type file $file is a symbolic link")
if $loglvl > 5;
return 0; # Unsecure file
}
}
local($ST_MODE) = 2 + $[; # Field st_mode from inode structure
unless ($exec || -O _) { # Reuse stat info from -e
&add_log("WARNING you do not own $type file $file") if $loglvl > 5;
return 0; # Unsecure file
}
local($st_mode) = (stat(_))[$ST_MODE];
if ($st_mode & $S_IWOTH) {
&add_log("WARNING $type file $file is world writable!") if $loglvl > 5;
return 0; # Unsecure file
}
# If file is excutable and seg[ug]id, make sure it's not publicly writable.
# If writable at all, only the owner should have the rights. That's for
# systems which do no reset the set[ug]id bit on write to the file.
if (-x _) {
if (($st_mode & $S_ISUID) && ($st_mode & ($S_IWGRP|$S_IWOTH))) {
&add_log("WARNING setuid $type file $file is writable!")
if $loglvl > 5;
return 0;
}
if (($st_mode & $S_ISGID) && ($st_mode & ($S_IWGRP|$S_IWOTH))) {
&add_log("WARNING setgid $type file $file is writable!")
if $loglvl > 5;
return 0;
}
}
return 1 unless $cf'secure =~ /on/i || $< == 0;
# Extra checks for secure mode (or if root user). We make sure the
# file is not writable by group and then we conduct the same secure tests
# on the directory itself
if (($st_mode & $S_IWGRP) && $cf'groupsafe !~ /^off/i) {
&add_log("WARNING $type file $file is group writable!") if $loglvl > 5;
return 0; # Unsecure file
}
local($dir); # directory where file is located
$dir = '.' unless ($dir) = ($file =~ m|(.*)/.*|);
unless ($exec || -O $dir) {
&add_log("WARNING you do not own directory of $type file $file")
if $loglvl > 5;
return 0; # Unsecure directory, therefore unsecure file
}
$st_mode = (stat(_))[$ST_MODE];
return 0 unless &check_st_mode($dir, 1);
# If linkdirs is OFF, we do not check further when faced with a symbolic
# link to a directory.
if (-l $dir && $cf'linkdirs !~ /^off/i && !&symdir_secure($dir, $type)) {
&add_log("WARNING directory of $type file $file is an unsecure symlink")
if $loglvl > 5;
return 0; # Unsecure directory
}
1; # At last! File is secure...
}
# Is a symbolic link to a directory secure?
sub symdir_secure {
local($dir, $type) = @_;
if (&symdir_check($dir, 0)) {
&add_log("symbolic directory $dir for $type file is secure")
if $loglvl > 11;
return 1;
}
0; # Not secure
}
# Is a symbolic link to a file secure?
# Returns the final target if all links up to that file are secure, undef
# if one of the links is not secure enough.
sub symfile_secure {
local($file, $type) = @_;
local($target) = &symfile_check($file, 0);
if (defined $target) {
&add_log("symbolic file $file for $type file is secure")
if $loglvl > 11;
} else {
&add_log("WARNING symbolic file $file for $type file is unsecure")
if $loglvl > 5;
}
return $target;
}
# A symbolic directory (that is a symlink pointing to a directory) is secure
# if and only if:
# - its target is a symlink that recursively proves to be secure.
# - the target lies in a non world-writable directory
# - the final directory at the end of the symlink chain is not world-writable
# - less than $MAX_LINKS levels of indirection are needed to reach a real dir
# Unfortunately, we cannot check for group writability here for the parent
# target directory since the target might lie in a system directory which may
# have a legitimate need to be read/write for root and wheel, for instance.
# The routine returns 1 if the file is secure, 0 otherwise.
sub symdir_check {
local($dir, $level) = @_; # Directory, indirection level
$MAX_LINKS = 100 unless defined $MAX_LINKS; # May have been overridden
if ($level++ > $MAX_LINKS) {
&add_log("ERROR more than $MAX_LINKS levels of symlinks to reach $dir")
if $loglvl;
return 0
}
local($ndir) = readlink($dir);
unless (defined $ndir) {
&add_log("SYSERR readlink: $!") if $loglvl;
return 0;
}
$dir =~ s|(.*)/.*|$1|; # Suppress link component (tail)
$dir = &cdir($ndir, $dir); # Follow symlink to get its final path target
local($still_link) = -l $dir;
unless (-d $dir || $still_link) {
&add_log("ERROR inconsistency: $dir is a plain file?") if $loglvl;
return 0; # Reached a plain file while following links to a dir!
}
unless (-d "$dir/..") {
&add_log("ERROR inconsistency: $dir/.. is not a directory?") if $loglvl;
return 0; # Reached a file hooked nowhere in the file system!
}
# Check parent directory
local($ST_MODE) = 2 + $[; # Field st_mode from inode structure
$st_mode = (stat(_))[$ST_MODE];
return 0 unless &check_st_mode("$dir/..", 0);
# Recurse if still a symbolic link
if ($still_link) {
return 0 unless &symdir_check($dir, $level);
} else {
$st_mode = (stat($dir))[$ST_MODE];
return 0 unless &check_st_mode($dir, 1);
}
1; # Ok, link is secure
}
# Same as symdir_check, but target is a file!
sub symfile_check {
local($file, $level) = @_; # File, indirection level
return undef if $level++ > $MAX_LINKS;
local($nfile) = readlink($file);
unless (defined $nfile) {
&add_log("SYSERR readlink: $!") if $loglvl;
return undef;
}
local($dir) = $file; # Where symlink was held
$dir =~ s|(.*)/.*|$1|; # Suppress link component (tail)
$file = &cdir($nfile, $dir); # Follow symlink to get its path
local($still_link) = -l $file;
unless (-f $file || $still_link) {
&add_log("ERROR $file does not exist") if !-e _ && $loglvl;
&add_log("ERROR $file is not a plain file") if -e _ && $loglvl;
return undef; # Reached something that is not a plain file
}
# Check parent directory
($dir = $file) =~ s|(.*)/.*|$1|;
local($ST_MODE) = 2 + $[; # Field st_mode from inode structure
$st_mode = (stat($dir))[$ST_MODE];
return undef unless &check_st_mode($dir, 1);
return $file unless $still_link; # Ok, link is secure
return &symfile_check($file, $level); # Still a symbolic link
}
# Returns true if mode in $st_mode does not include world or group writable
# bits, false otherwise. This helps factorizing code used in both &file_secure
# and &symdir_check. Set $both to true if both world/group checks are desirable,
# false to get only world checks.
sub check_st_mode {
local($dir, $both) = @_;
if ($st_mode & $S_IWOTH) {
&add_log("WARNING directory $dir of $type file is world writable!")
if $loglvl > 5;
return 0; # Unsecure directory
}
return 1 unless $both;
if (($st_mode & $S_IWGRP) && $cf'groupsafe !~ /^off/i) {
&add_log("WARNING directory $dir of $type file is group writable!")
if $loglvl > 5;
return 0; # Unsecure directory
}
1;
}
# Make sure the file we are about to execute is secure. If it is a script
# with the '#!' kernel hook, also check the interpreter! Returns true if the
# file can be executed "safely".
sub exec_secure {
local($file) = @_; # File to be executed
unless (-x $file) {
&add_log("ERROR lacking execute rights on $file") if $loglvl > 1;
return 0;
}
return 1 if $cf'execskip =~ /^on/i; # Assume safe to be exec'ed
local($cf'secure) = $cf'execsafe; # Use exec settings for file_secure()
unless (&file_secure($file, 'program', 1)) {
&add_log("ERROR cannot execute unsecure $file") if $loglvl > 1;
return 0;
}
&add_log("can allow exec() of $file") if $loglvl > 17;
return 1 unless -T $file; # Safe as far as we can tell, unless script...
local($head); # Heading line
local($interpretor); # Interpretor running the script
local($perl) = ''; # Empiric support for perl scripts
local(*SCRIPT);
unless (open(SCRIPT, $file)) {
&add_log("SYSERR open: $!") if $loglvl > 1;
&add_log("ERROR cannot check script $file") if $loglvl > 1;
return 0;
}
$head = <SCRIPT>;
# Allow empiric support for common perl scripts
# This is not bullet-proof, but should guard against common errors.
if ($head =~ /\bperl\b/) {
$perl = <SCRIPT>;
if ($perl =~ /\beval\b.*\bexec\s+(\S+)/) {
$perl = $1;
} else {
$perl = ''; # False alarm, can't check further
}
}
close SCRIPT;
($interpretor) = $head =~ /^#!\s*(\S+)/;
$interpretor = '/bin/sh' unless $interpretor;
unless (-x $interpretor) {
&add_log("ERROR lacking execute rights on $interpretor") if $loglvl > 1;
return 0;
}
unless (&file_secure($interpretor, 'interpretor', 1)) {
&add_log("ERROR cannot run unsecure interpretor $interpretor")
if $loglvl > 1;
&add_log("ERROR cannot allow execution of script $file") if $loglvl > 1;
return 0;
}
&add_log("can allow $interpretor to run $file") if $loglvl > 17;
return 1 unless $perl; # Okay, can run the script
$perl = &locate_program($perl) unless $perl =~ m|/|;
unless (-x $perl) {
&add_log("ERROR lacking execute rights on $perl") if $loglvl > 1;
return 0;
}
unless (&file_secure($perl, 'perl', 1)) {
&add_log("ERROR cannot run unsecure perl $perl")
if $loglvl > 1;
&add_log("ERROR cannot allow execution of perl script $file")
if $loglvl > 1;
return 0;
}
&add_log("can allow $perl to run $file") if $loglvl > 17;
return 1; # Okay, perl can run it
}
# Apply directory changes into current path and return new directory
sub cdir {
local($dir, $cur) = @_; # New relative path, current directory
return $dir if $dir =~ m|^/|; # Already an absolute path
chop($cur = `pwd`) unless defined $cur;
local(@cur) = split(/\//, $cur);
local(@dir) = split(/\//, $dir);
local($path);
foreach $item (@dir) {
next if $item eq '.'; # Stay in same dir
if ($item eq '..') { # Move up
pop(@cur);
} else {
push(@cur, $item); # Move down
}
}
local($path) = '/' . join('/', @cur);
$path =~ tr|/||s; # Successive '/' are useless
$path;
}
package addr;
#
# Address stuff, mainly for mailing list maintainance (package command)
#
# Is an address valid?
# Addresses containing either '|' or '/' in them are considered hostile, since
# sendmail for instance would attempt to deliver to a program or to a file...
# Also, the address must not contain any space or control characters.
# Since the address might also be given verbatim on a shell command line,
# it must not contain any "funny" shell meta-characters.
sub valid {
local($_) = @_;
return 0 if $_ eq ''; # Empty address
return 0 if tr/\0-\31//; # Control character found
return 0 if /\s/; # No space in address
return 0 if m![\$^&*()[{}`\\|;><?]!;
1; # Address is ok
}
# Simplify address for comparaison purposes
sub simplify {
local($_) = @_;
return &simplify($_) if s/^@[\w-.]+://; # @b.c:x -> x and retry
return "$2\@$1.uucp" if /^([\w-]+)!(\w+)$/; # b!u -> u@b.uucp
return "$2\@$1" if /^([\w-.]+)!(\w+)$/; # b.c!u -> u@b.c
return $_ if /^[\w.-]+@[\w-.]+$/; # u@b.c
return &simplify("$2!$3")
if /([^%@]+)!([\w-.]+)!(\w+)$/; # ...!b!u -> b!u
return "$1\@$2"
if /^([\w.-]+)%([\w-.]+)@[\w-.]+/; # u%b.c@d.e -> u@b.c
return &simplify($1) if s/(.*)@[\w-.]+$//; # x@b.c -> x and retry
return &simplify("$1\@$2")
if /^([\w-.%!]+)%([\w-.]+)$/; # x%b -> x@b and retry
return $_; # Hmm... Better stop here, since we are clueless!!
}
# Does first address matches second address?
sub match {
local($a1, $a2) = @_; # Two plain e-mail addresses (no comments)
$a1 =~ tr/A-Z/a-z/; # Cannonicalize to lower case
$a2 =~ tr/A-Z/a-z/;
local($s1) = &simplify($a1);
local($s2) = &simplify($a2);
return 1 if $s1 eq $s2;
# Face ram@lyon.eiffel.com versus ram@york.eiffel.com or ram@eiffel.com
# We do not want a match in the first case, but it's ok for the other one.
local($p1, $p2) = ($s1, $s2);
$p1 =~ s/(\W)/\\$1/g;
$p2 =~ s/(\W)/\\$1/g;
$p1 =~ s/@/@[\\w-]+\\./;
$p2 =~ s/@/@[\\w-]+\\./;
$s1 =~ /^$p2$/ || $s2 =~ /^$p1$/;
}
# Are the two addresses close?
# They are if they match or if their login name is the same or they are
# within the same subdomain.domain.country or domain.country.
sub close {
local($a1, $a2) = @_; # Two plain e-mail addresses (no comments)
return 1 if &match($a1, $a2);
$a1 =~ tr/A-Z/a-z/; # Cannonicalize to lower case
$a2 =~ tr/A-Z/a-z/;
$a1 = &simplify($a1);
$a2 = &simplify($a2);
local($l1, $l2); # Login names
local($d1, $d2); # Domain names
($l1) = $a1 =~ /^(.*)@/;
($l2) = $a2 =~ /^(.*)@/;
return 1 if $l1 ne '' && $l1 eq $l2;
($d1) = $a1 =~ /\@([\w-]+\.[\w-]+\.[\w]+)$/;
($d2) = $a2 =~ /\@([\w-]+\.[\w-]+\.[\w]+)$/;
return 1 if $d1 ne '' && $d1 eq $d2;
($d1) = $a1 =~ /\@([\w-]+\.[\w]+)$/;
($d2) = $a2 =~ /\@([\w-]+\.[\w]+)$/;
return 1 if $d1 ne '' && $d1 eq $d2;
return 0;
}
package main;
|